## INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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- 1. Until his death in August 1948, Andrey A. Zhdanov was generally considered in Communist circles as Stalin's future successor and as a spiritual leader of the Cominform. His influence in the Cominform was beginning to be greater than that of Stalin. This led to the belief that Stalin, because of old age and illness, intended to give up his position as the leader of international Communism and to devote himself to the solution of the internal political problems of the USSR. For this reason, the leaders of the various Communist Parties showed a willingness to submit to Zhdanov's leadership, although some of them, such as Togliatti and Thorez, voiced certain objections to the political radicalism of Zhdanov.
- The political thinking of Zhdanov was based on the supposition that the western world was weakened to such an extent that it would be possible to launch a general offensive against it, and with success. Therefore, Zhdanov insisted that an extensive propagada campaign, directed against the underestimation of one's own strength and the overestimation of the forces of the western world, be carried on by individual Communist Parties. The purpose of this campaign would be the creation of a certain war psychosis among the members of the Communist Parties, since Zhdanov himself regarded war with the West as inevitable. The first strategic step towards the preparation of this offensive was to be the liquidation of all the opponents of the Communist regime in the Balkan states and in the states of Central Europe. Here, an especially great importance was attached to Czechoslovakia, and that not only for military-strategic reasons, but for economic reasons as well. Zhdanov based his theory about the inevitability of World War III on an economic study by his closest friend, Professor Nikolay A. Voznesenskiy, who was also member of the Soviet Politburo. Voznesenskiy had asserted that the capitalist world was on the verge of a great eronomic crisis, the consequence of which would be World War III. After the seizure of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had been successfully completed, the offensive against the West European countries was to be carried out, and these countries also were to be brought under Soviet influence.

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3.	Zhdanov was able to win for his radical policy many leading personages of	
	the Communist world. The first was Tito, whose radicalism was close to the	25V
	conceptions of Zhdanov.	25X 25X
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- 4. After Zhdanov's unexpected death in 1948, the leaders of the individual Communist Parties began to discuss whether Zhdanov's line was tactically correct and whether it was to be continued. After Tito's secession and Dimitrov's death, they began to wonder whether the excessive radicalism of Zhdanov would not lead to a premature outbreak of a new world war, for which the Communist world was not yet psychologically prepared. Of the leaders of international Communism it was especially Togliatti, Gottwald, Gomulka, and Thorez who objected to the risk of the new world war. The opponents of Zhdanov's policy benefited from an economic study by Professor Yevgeniy D. Varga, who maintained, unlike Voznesenskiy, the theory that capitalism in the United States and other non-Communist states had been stabilized. Although Varga's theories were later characterized by the Politburo as incorrect, they nevertheless exercised some influence on the international Communist world, which began to have doubts about the correctness of Zhdanov's radicalism.
- 5. As for the attitude of Stalin and Malenkov towards the policy proclaimed by Zhdanov, it was and still is generally supposed in the West that both Stalin and Malenkov were opposed to Zhdanov's international political concepts and that, therefore, Zhdanov had been "liquidated". However, from remarks made by trained Communists, it appeared that Stalin, Malenkov, and the rest of the Politburo agreed in principal with Zhdanov insofar as the general international political line of Soviet expansion was concerned. This meant practically that there were no disagreements regarding the final aims of Soviet foreign policy. The difference in the views of Stalin and Zhdanov concerned the tactics with which this aim was to be attained. Stalin and Malenkov shared the opinion that the open aggression required by Zhdanov would involve great risk and that it was first of all necessary to break the united front of the West before launching any further actions. This Stalin-Malenkov line was actually set in motion.
- 6. Tito was one of the most prominent partisans of Zhdanov's policy. Tito's secession from the Soviet bloc affected the rest of Zhdanov's partisans like a cold shower bath, since they saw in it a great weakening of Zhdanov's position. In this connection, it was stated several times that the too close friendship between Tito and Zhdanov was one of the reasons for Tito's exclusion from the Cominform.
- 7. As far as the relationship between Zhdanov and Malenkov was concerned, it has been generally known that their personal relations were not particularly friendly. Malenkov, who was regarded as a man with an "iron hand", was said to disagree with many points of the international political line of Zhdanov, although he never openly opposed Zhdanov. Stalin long hesitated whether to favor the radicalism of Zhdanov or the moderating Malenkov-Molotov line. Finally, he decided to favor the views of Malenkov and Molotov, and the result was Zhdanov's death in August 1948. Let it be noted that Tito's secession from the Cominform and Zhdanov's death followed each other in a close sequence.
- 8. To what extent Zhdanov's death may be attributed to Stalin or Malenkov is not known. Even close personal friends never discussed such a possibility. Relatively early, however, after Zhdanov's death one ceased to speak about him, and even during the political schooling of Communist functionaries Zhdanov's name and his views were not too much stressed.
- 9. However, it also can be said that up until the 19th Party Congress, Malenkov's name was not particularly stressed, and he remained for a long time a "man in the background". His name and his real importance in the management of the Soviet Communist Partywas known only to the leading workers of the Communist

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Party; whereas, to lower functionaries and rank and file members Malenkov was known as Stalin's personal secretary only, i.e., as a mere executive organ of Stalin's will. In the discussions of Communist leaders about the bosses in the Kremlin, Malenkov's name was cited only seldom.	
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